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Bioterrorism has become a potential diagnostic consideration in infectious diseases. This
article reviews the clinical presentation and differential diagnosis of potential bioterrorist
agents when first presenting to the hospital in the emergency room setting. The
characteristic clinical features of inhalation anthrax, tularemic pneumonia, plague pneu-
monia, including laboratory and radiographic finding, are discussed. Ebola vieus and
smallpox are also discussed as potential bioterrorist-transmitted infections from the
clinical and epidemiologic standpoint. In addition to the clinical features of the infectious
diseases mentioned, the artical discusses the infectious disease control and epidemiologic
implications of these agents when employed as bioterrorist agents. The review concludes
with suggestions for postexposure prophylaxis and therapy.
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The emergency room is the most likely place
where victims of bioterrorism will first be encoun-
tered and evaluated. As we have learned from the
anthrax experience in New York, mass casualties
are not necessarily to be expected. Even if large
numbers of individuals are involved in a bioter-
rorist attack, the initial cases will present as iso-
lated incidents or irregularly in low numbers.
Once an outbreak is identified, then it is relatively
easy to disseminate information on the nature of
the infectious disease agent, in terms of its recog-
nition and control. Emergency room personnel,
with the assistance of infectious disease clinicians,
are the sentinels at the gate.
Biological agents for potential use in bioterror-
ism are many. Some are more readily available and
easier to employ than are others. The most likely
agents to be involved in bioterrorism attacks
include Bacillus anthracis, Yersinia pestis, Clostri-
dium botulinum, Francisella tularensis, and possibly
the viral agents of African hemorrhagic fevers. The
emergency room, as the initial point of contact for
most bioterrorism victims, has three critical func-
tions early in an attack. The initial function of
physicians and consultants at the emergency room
level would be to identify sentinel cases involved
in the bioterrorism attack. It is critical to recognize
that a problem exists and will soon involve larger
numbers of individuals. Aside from clinical recog-
nition of the signs and symptoms of agents related
to bioterrorism, the emergency room has an
important infection control role. Infectious disease
clinicians will be essential to assist their emer-
gency room colleagues, and infection control per-
sonnel will be needed to limit the spread of
biological agents within the emergency room set-
ting to other patients as well as medical personnel.
Containment measures will be particularly impor-
tant with biological agents that are transmitted via
the airborne route, or by person-to-person contact.
Finally, general supportive measures and specific
antimicrobial therapy, antitoxins or vaccines will
be needed to treat the affected patients, and this
treatment will begin in the emergency room.
Emergency room personnel will need the early
and substantial support of specialists related to the
problems encountered with the various bioterror-
ist agents. Infectious disease consultants will be
critical in the evaluation of all potential or real
bioterrorist cases. Infection control, as mentioned
previously, will be essential in containing the
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infection where appropriate, to prevent loss by
illness of critical medical personnel during an
outbreak. Physicians with experience in toxin-
mediated diseases will also be needed if these
agents are employed in a bioterrorism attack.
On-going supportive care will be needed in the
management phase for those severely affected by
the attack. The emergency room also requires
intensive support from the microbiology labora-
tory, and must be in communication with autho-
rities to alert others of potential or actual threats
from biological weapons [1–8].
B I O L O G I C A L W E A P O N S
T R A N S M I T T E D B Y F O O D O R W A T E R
Clostridium botulinum
C. botulinum is a spore-forming organism that
produces a potent exotoxin. The exotoxin is ther-
molabile, but is extremely potent. Minute
amounts, if properly dispersed and disseminated,
would be sufficient to eliminate the entire human
population. Highly purified botulism toxin is
stable, easily transportable, and readily dispersed.
Ideal vehicles for the transmission of the toxin
would be water supplies and selected food items,
but fortunately, such transmission is difficult to
achieve. Food-borne botulism requires the intro-
duction of the toxin into foods at the level of the
packing plant. This would require terrorists using
this biological agent to have access to such a
facility. In contrast, water-borne botulism toxin
would be much easier to use, but because of
difficulties with dispersal of the toxin in large
volumes of water, it would be difficult to utilize.
Botulism toxin could be easily placed in reservoirs
or water tanks, but would not mix completely or
evenly in the target volume of water. Therefore,
water-borne botulism is likely to occur as sporadic
attacks, since it is unlikely that large numbers of
people would be affected simultaneously, due to
the difficulties in dispersing the toxin in large
volumes of water. In the emergency room, botu-
lism will present as descending symmetric paraly-
sis, starting with cranial nerve involvement. Onset
would be heralded by the presence of blurry
vision, which is rapidly followed by ocular muscle
paralysis, difficulty in speaking, and/or the inabil-
ity to swallow. Fever is not a feature of botulism,
since it is a toxin-mediated disorder. There are few
other conditions that could be confused with botu-
lism clinically, but neurologic consultation is
advised to rule out other neurologic conditions
with similar features. Respiratory paralysis may
occur in severe cases. Importantly, mental status is
unaffected by botulism; no signs of encephalitis or
encephalopathy are present, and nuchal rigidity is
not present, i.e. there is no evidence of meningitis.
The incubation period is 10–12 h, but this will not
be helpful in the initial evaluation of the patient.
The incubation period is inversely proportional to
the quantity of toxin ingested. Some patients may
have profuse vomiting without diarrhea. Differ-
ential diagnostic possibilities include bulbar palsy,
Guillain–Barre syndrome, or polio, but these con-
ditions do not closely resemble botulism. Guillain–
Barre syndrome is usually accompanied by some
degree of fever, has a sensory component, and
characteristically begins as ascending rather than
descending paralysis. Diagnosis of botulism is
confirmed by detecting botulism toxin in the stool
or serum [9–13].
Enteropathogens
Toxigenic or enteropathogenic Escherichia coli, Sal-
monella or Vibrio cholerae are potential biological
weapons. Such agents would have to be intro-
duced into water supplies in large numbers to
be recognized as biological weapons. At any given
time, there are sufficient sporadic cases of poorly
characterized febrile diarrheal illnesses in the
population to make the detection of these agents
difficult. Only if they occurred in large num-
bers, suggesting an outbreak, could the possibility
of bioterrorist be entertained. Clinicians are famil-
iar with the clinical presentation of these infecti-
ous diseases and they are rarely fatal. The use
of enteropathogens as biological weapons would
create anxiety and cause some illness, but
would be minimally disruptive to society. When
these infectious diseases are not self-limited,
they are readily treatable with antimicrobial
agents [4–6].
B I O L O G I C A L W E A P O N S
T R A N S M I T T E D B Y C O N T A C T
Ebola/viral hemorrhagic fevers
Person-to-person transmission is a potential way
to spread some bioterrorist agents, particularly
pneumonic plague and agents of African hemor-
rhagic fevers. These agents are highly contagious
and difficult to handle, and because of this are not
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likely to be utilized as biological weapons. Ebola
fever, Rift Valley fever, etc. could be transmitted
by a terrorist willing to be infected by these agents.
The terrorist would have to travel to the intended
area during the incubation period of the infection
in order to initiate person-to-person transmission,
by secretion contact and/or, to a lesser extent, by
airborne dissemination. Ebola fever begins with
severe headache and fever, followed quickly by
gastrointestinal symptoms, usually accompanied
by nausea and vomiting. As Ebola fever pro-
gresses, fever and severe myalgias remit for a
few days, and then the patient worsens. Liver
involvement and bleeding problems characterize
the late stages of advanced Ebola fever. Physicians
in the emergency room should be suspicious of
patients with the abrupt onset of a severe illness
characterized by headache, myalgias, and nausea
and vomiting. Over several days, patients may
develop a camelback fever curve, and a pulse
temperature deficit (relative bradycardia). Ebola
and related hemorrhagic fevers are often accom-
panied by leukopenia, lymphopenia, and throm-
bocytopenia; these are important laboratory clues
to help the clinician differentiate these illnesses
from sporadic cases of gastroenteritis in the com-
munity. By the time that petechiae/ecchymoses or
bleeding diatheses appear, the diagnosis should be
obvious. Clinical diagnosis is confirmed by sero-
logic testing. With suspected African hemorrhagic
fevers, patients should be subjected to strict
airborne isolation and contact precautions until
the diagnosis is ruled out. Specimens sent to
the laboratory should be considered as extremely
biohazardous and handled accordingly. There is
no specific treatment for any of the viral hemor-
rhagic fevers, and therapy is supportive [14–20]
(Table 1).
Table 1 Differential diagnosis of African hemorrhagic fever
Yellow fever Lassa fever Marburg virus disease Ebola virus
Location Central Africa West Africa East Africa East Africa
Onset Sudden Gradual Sudden Sudden
Symptoms
Severe headache/
myalgias/lumbar backache
þ þ þ þ
Tinnitus  þ  
Sore throat  þ þ þ
Dry cough/chest pain  þ þ þ
Nausea/vomiting/
abdominal pain
þ  þ þ
Diarrhea   þ þ
Renal failure   þ þ
Signs
Relative bradycardia þ þ þ þ
Biphasic fever pattern þ þ þ þ
Conjunctivitis  þ þ þ
Conjunctival suffusion þ þ þ þ
Rash   Scarlatiniform Maculopapular
Adenopathy  Cervical Generalized 
Facial/neck edema  þ  
Laboratory abnormalities
Leukopenia! leukocytosis þ þ þ þ
Atypical lymphocytosis þ þ þ þ
Thrombocytopenia þ þ þ þ
"SGOT þ þ þ þ
Late complications If not death
from acute
hepatic
necrosis,
none
Iritis,
deafness,
ARDS,
seizures,
oculogyric
crises
Myocarditis,
orchitis
desquamation,
scrotal/labial
dermatitis,
ARDS
Extreme
malaise,
profound
loss of
appetite
Reproduced with permission from: Gill MV, Cunha BA. Ebola hemorrhagic fever. Infect Dis Practice 1995; 19: 37–41.
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B I O L O G I C A L W E A P O N S
T R A N S F E R R E D B Y T H E
A I R B O R N E R O U T E
Smallpox
Like most infectious diseases, smallpox is most
contagious during the incubation period before the
onset of the rash. The initial patients in a biological
attack using smallpox will present before the rash
appears. The rash in smallpox does not appear for
at least 3 days after the on-set of symptoms.
Patients initially complain of headache and myal-
gias, and may have a diffuse maculopapular rash
prior to their subsequent vesicular eruption.
Fevers are high and have a characteristic pattern.
The fever initially decreases without treatment on
day two, before increasing again prior to the vesi-
cular eruption on or after day three. Patients may
complain of gastrointestinal symptoms at the out-
set of the illness. Patients also appear irritable and
uncomfortable before the rash appears. The
appearance of the rash is heralded by a decrease
in temperature and the appearance of vesicles
beginning on the head and face. Vesicles increase
and become prominent on the chest, have a cen-
trifugal distribution on the extremities, and
involve the palms and the soles. In the early
vesicular stage, smallpox is most likely to be con-
fused with chicken pox. The constitutional symp-
toms, as well as the distribution of the rash, readily
differentiate it from other vesicular rashes, e.g. orf,
dermatitis, or herpetiformis, and atypical measles.
In chicken pox, the rash progresses in successions
of crops of new vesicles every few hours, and
abruptly stops after 3 days. The vesicles are not
as large or umbilicated as in smallpox. Patients are
not as toxemic in appearance as with smallpox.
The vesicles of chicken pox resemble a dewdrop
on a rose petal, and lesions in chicken pox all
present at different stages of eruption. In smallpox,
characteristically, the lesions, are all in the same
stage of development when they appear. Hemor-
rhagic smallpox may present with diffuse bleeding
into the skin. Smallpox and chicken pox are clinical
diagnoses. If there is any confusion in differentiat-
ing the two, a Tzanck test should be performed.
Cytoplasmic inclusion bodies seen in stained
scrapings from the vesicle base are present in
chicken pox but not in smallpox. Both chicken
pox and smallpox are highly contagious via the
airborne route, and require strict airborne isola-
tion. Patients are no longer contagious after the
lesions crust. The treatment of smallpox is cur-
rently symptomatic. Although cidofovir has in
vitro activity against the smallpox virus, it is fairly
toxic and can only be administered intravenously.
Children and young adults have not been vacci-
nated against smallpox. The immunity of older
adults previously immunized against smallpox is
not known at the present time. If smallpox is
identified in a patient, it must be assumed to
represent a bioterrorism attack, since natural cases
no longer exist. Accordingly, officials must be
contacted for immediate distribution of the small-
pox vaccine. Some older individuals may develop
immunity more rapidly than their younger coun-
terparts, due to the anamnestic response to
the previous smallpox vaccine [21–26] (Table 2,
Figure 1).
Tularemia
F. tularensis is a highly virulent organism with
different manifestations depending upon inocu-
lum/site of infection. It is unlikely that F. tularensis
would be used as a weapon of bioterrorism, since it
has no stable spore phase, and is highly virulent
and difficult to handle. It would be difficult to
aerosolize this organism without infecting those
processing and handling the organism for use in
biological warfare. Should tularemia be used,
aerosol spread would be the most likely mode
of deployment. In the emergency room, patients
would present with an atypical pneumonia. Most
clinicians are now familiar with the fact that aty-
pical pathogens are characterized by extrapulmon-
ary manifestations. The most common atypical
pneumonias encountered in the emergency room
setting are Mycoplasma pneumoniae pneumonia and
legionnaires’ disease. Legionnaires’ disease is
most likely to be confused with tularemic pneu-
monia, but these two may be differentiated fairly
well by clinical signs and symptoms. Patients with
tularemia, in contrast to those with legionnaires’
disease, have a clear sensorium, but both may
present with a headache. The headache of tular-
emia, however, is severe and usually associated
with prominent myalgias. The chest X-ray pattern
of tularemic pneumonia is nondescript, as is that of
legionnaires’ disease. Infiltrates in tularemic pneu-
monia may be unilateral or bilateral, but they are
usually accompanied by pleural effusion and/or
hilar adenopathy. Tularemic pneumonia is more
likely to be confused with inhalation anthrax than
 2002 Copyright by the European Society of Clinical Microbiology and Infectious Diseases, CMI, 8, 489–503
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with legionnaires’ disease. Both inhalation anthrax
and tularemic pneumonia have mediastinal
widening and pleural effusions as common fea-
tures. In legionnaires’ disease, serum transami-
nases are frequently mildly and transiently
elevated, in contrast to tularemic pneumonia, in
which the serum transaminases remain normal.
Relative bradycardia is a cardinal feature of legion-
naires’ disease but is not characteristic of tulare-
mia. Increases in CPK, erythrocyte sedimentation
rate, and CRP, and a decreased serum phosphorus,
strongly favor the diagnosis of legionnaires’ dis-
ease versus tularemia, anthrax, or typical bacterial
pneumonias. If the pleural effusions are tapped,
the pleural effusions of tularemia are sero-sangui-
nous or frankly hemorrhagic, which is uncommon
with other pulmonary infections, except for inha-
lation anthrax. F. tularensis is readily treatable, if
recognized early, with doxycycline. Quinolones
probably represent an acceptable alternative in
doxycycline-intolerant patients. From the infection
control standpoint, the main biohazard presented
by tularemia is in the handling of specimens by
personnel in the emergency room and microbiol-
ogy laboratory [27–35] (Tables 3–5).
Plague pneumonia
Pneumonic plague would be a devastating agent
to use in biological warfare. Unlike bubonic pla-
gue, pneumonic plague has the potential for per-
son-to-person airborne spread. If plague is
transmitted in this fashion, it has great potential
for spreading. However, Y. pestis has no spore
stage, and is difficult to process, handle and dis-
perse if used in aerosol form. Should anyone in a
non-endemic area develop pneumonic plague that
is not a complication of an ongoing bubonic plague
epidemic, then the plague may be considered to be
the result of the bioterrorism. Plague pneumonia is
nondescript in terms of chest X-ray appearance.
Patients are critically ill. The sputum is pink and
frothy and contains abundant bipolar-staining
Gram-negative bacilli. Hilar adenopathy and
pleural effusions are not features of pneumonic
plague. Circulatory collapse is common as the
infection progresses, as is the case with inhalation
anthrax. Diagnosis is established by demonstrat-
ing the organism in sputum or blood samples.
Plague may be treated with streptomycin or dox-
ycycline. From an infection control standpoint,
person-to-person spread of plague from patientsT
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with pneumonic plague may be contained by
using appropriate airborne precaution procedures
[36–44] (Tables 6–8).
Anthrax
Because anthrax is a naturally occurring infectious
disease, there is much experience with recognizing
and treating naturally acquired inhalational and
cutaneous anthrax. However, in the 2001–2002 US
experience, weapons-grade anthrax was used as a
weapon of bioterrorism for the first time. Cuta-
neous anthrax derived from weapons-grade
anthrax is clinically the same as naturally acquired
cutaneous anthrax. However, the clinical presen-
tation of inhalational anthrax due to weapons-
grade B. anthracis spores is different from that of
cases previously occurring with naturally ac-
quired inhalation anthrax. Except for the previous
incident occurring in Sverdlosk in the Soviet
Union due to an accident at a biological weapons
facility, the New York experience is the only care-
fully studied and reported experience with inhala-
tion anthrax from the inhalation of weapons-grade
spores. Patients presenting with inhalation an-
thrax do not feel well for several days during
the prodromal period, and frequently complain
of substernal discomfort and fever; sometimes,
gastrointestinal symptoms are present at this
stage. Patients still do not feel well, but subse-
quently improve over the next day or two, and
then in most cases the infection progresses.
The second phase of anthrax is characterized by
high fever, oppressive sternal chest pain mimick-
ing an acute myocardial infarction, and shortness
of breath. Chest X-ray may reveal small bilateral
pleural effusions, with or without a widened med-
iastinum. Since inhalation anthrax results in a
Figure 1 Smallpox: relationship of fever to signs and symptoms. Reproduced with permission from: Cunha BA. Smallpox:
an osterian primer. Infect Dis Practice 2002; 26.
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Table 3 Tularemia: empirical therapy for presumed tularemic pneumonia
Exposed hosts Preferred initial therapy IV!PO switch
Total duration of
therapy (IV/PO)
Adults Streptomycin 1 g (IM)
every 12 h
NA 10 days
or
Gentamicin 5 mg/kg (IM/IV)
every 24 h
NA 10 days
or
Doxycycline 200 mg (IV)
every 12 h
Doxycycline 100 mg (PO)
every 12 h
14 days
or or
Chloramphenicol 500 mg (IV)
every 6 h
Chloramphenicol 250 mg (PO)
every 6 h
14 days
or or
Ciprofloxacin 400 mg (IV)
every 12 h
Ciprofloxacin 500 mg (PO)
every 12 h
10 days
or or
Levofloxacin 500 mg (IV)
every 24 h
Levofloxacin 500 mg (PO)
every 24 h
10 days
or or
Gatifloxacin 400 mg (IV)
every 24 h
Gatifloxacin 400 mg (PO)
every 24 h
10 days
Children
>12 years Same as adults
<12 years Streptomycin 15 mg/kg (IM)
every 12 h
NA 10 days
or
Gentamicin 5 mg/kg (IM/IV)
every 24 h
NA 10 days
or
Doxycycline 2.2 mg/kg (IV)
every 12 h
Doxycycline 2.2 mg/kg (PO)
every 12 h
14 days
or
Ciprofloxacin 30 mg/kg (IV)
every 12 h
Ciprofloxacin 30 mg/kg (PO)
every 12 h
10 days
or
Levofloxacin 250 mg (IV)
every 24 h
Levofloxacin 250 mg (PO)
every 24 h
10 days
or
Gatifloxacin 200 mg (IV)
every 24 h
Gatifloxacin 200 mg (PO)
every 24 h
10 days
Table 4 Tularemia: infection control considerations
Potential for
patient-to-patient
spread
Potential for
patient-to-medical
personnel spread
Infection
control
precautions
Recommended
disinfection
procedures
Post-exposure
prophylaxis of
medical contacts
Emergency room/
hospital
None None Standard
universal
precautions
Sodium hypochlorite
or
quaternary ammonia
compounds
(avoid aerosolization
of infectious materials)
þ
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hemorrhagic mediastinitis and not pneumonia,
demonstration of a widening mediastinum should
suggest the diagnosis of inhalation anthrax in
acutely ill febrile patients. The mediastinal widen-
ing due to hemorrhagic mediastinitis is detected
earliest and best by chest CT/MRI. As mention-
ed previously, the hemorrhagic mediastinitis
may be inapparent or minimally apparent on
the conventional chest X-ray, and if there is any
question about the possibility of anthrax or inter-
pretation of the plain film, then a chest CT/MRI
should be obtained immediately. Liver function
tests have been reported as being abnormal in
inhalation anthrax cases; otherwise, routine
laboratory tests are unhelpful, except for throm-
bocytopenia, which is a variable finding. In hemor-
rhagic mediastinitis, the fact that the inhaled
spores have been milled to a very small diameter
and processed with a surface tension-reducing
agent allows individual spores to reach the alveoli.
The spores are ingested by the alveolar macro-
phages and transported via the lymphatics to the
lymph nodes of the mediastinum. There they
interfere with hemostasis locally, resulting in hemo-
rrhage at the mediastinum. If the inoculum of
inhaled weapons-grade spores is sufficiently high,
a localized pneumonitis in the segment of the lung
receivingthehighsporeconcentrationcan result ina
pulmonary infiltrate in addition to the findings of
hemorrhagic mediastinitis described.
Anthrax meningitis frequently accompanies
cases of inhalation anthrax, so emergency room
physicians must be alert to patients presenting
with central nervous system findings in addition
to their pulmonary symptoms. In some cases,
anthrax hemorrhagic leptomeningitis occurs alone
and/or overshadows the pulmonary component
of the infection. Lumbar puncture performed in
patients with anthrax meningitis reveals a PMN
predominance and abundant red blood cells. The
cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) glucose is depressed,
and the CSF protein is variably elevated. A Gram
stain of the CSF shows Gram-positive bacilli. In the
Sverdlosk experience, anthrax meningitis was
readily diagnosed at autopsy in patients who died
of anthrax meningitis. The characteristic appear-
ance has been termed ‘the cardinal’s cap’, in which
there is hemorrhage diffusely over the brain, invol-
ving the leptomeninges. This finding may be use-
ful in terms of retrospective diagnosis, but is
Post-exposure host
Preferred
antibiotic
Duration of
prophylaxis
Adults (normal/compromised
hosts)
Doxycycline 100 mg (PO)
every 12 h
14 days
or
Ciprofloxacin 400 mg (PO)
every 12 h
14 days
or
Levofloxacin 500 mg (PO)
every 24 h
14 days
or
Gatifloxacin 400 mg (PO)
every 24 h
14 days
Children (normal/compromised
hosts)
>12 years Same as adult
<12 years Amoxicillin 40 mg/kg (PO)
every 8 h
14 days
or
Ciprofloxacin 30 mg/kg (PO)
every 12 h
14 days
or
Levofloxacin 250 mg (PO)
every 24 h
14 days
or
Gatifloxacin 200 mg (PO)
every 24 h
14 days
Table 5 Tularemia: postexposure
prophylaxis
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Table 6 Empirical therapy for presumed plague
Exposed hosts Preferred initial therapy IV!PO switch
Total duration of
therapy (IV/PO)
Adults Streptomycin 1 g (IM)
every 12 h
NA 10 days
or
Gentamicin 5 mg/kg (IM/IV)
every 24 h
NA 10 days
or
Doxycycline 200 mg (IV)
every 12 h
Doxycycline 100 mg (PO)
every 12 h
14 days
or or
Chlorophenicol 500 mg (IV)
every 6 h
Chloramphenicol 250 mg (PO)
every 6 h
14 days
or or
Ciprofloxacin 400 mg (IV)
every 12 h
Ciprofloxacin 500 mg (PO)
every 12 h
10 days
or or
Levofloxacin 500 mg (IV)
every 24 h
Levofloxacin 500 mg (PO)
every 24 h
10 days
or or
Gatifloxacin 400 mg (IV)
every 24 h
Gatifloxacin 400 mg (PO)
every 24 h
10 days
Children
>12 years Same as adult
<12 years Streptomycin 15 mg/kg (IM)
every 12 h
NA 10 days
or
Gentamicin 5 mg/kg (IM/IV)
every 24 h
NA 10 days
or
Doxycycline 2.2 mg/kg (IV)
every 12 h
Doxycycline 2.2 mg/kg (PO)
every 12 h
14 days
or or
Ciprofloxacin 30 mg/kg (IV)
every 12 h
Ciprofloxacin 30 mg/kg (PO)
every 12 h
10 days
or or
Levofloxacin 250 mg (IV)
every 12 h
Levofloxacin 250 mg (PO)
every 24 h
10 days
or or
Gatifloxacin 200 mg (IV)
every 24 h
Gatifloxacin 200 mg (PO)
every 24 h
10 days
or or
Chloramphenicol 25 mg/kg (IV)
every 6 h
Chloramphenicol 25 mg/kg (PO)
every 6 h
14 days
Table 7 Plague: infection control considerations
Potential for
patient-to-
patient spread
Potential for
patient-to-medical
oersonnel spread
Infection
control
precautions
Recommended
disinfection
procedures
Post-exposure
prophylaxis of
medical contacts
Emergency room/
hospital
Low Low Standard
universal
precautions
plus surgical
masks
Sodium hypochlorite
or
quaternary ammonia
compounds
þ
(during first 48 h
of antibiotic
therapy)
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unhelpful in the initial management in the emer-
gency room setting (Table 9).
If anthrax spores are ingested, gastrointestinal
anthrax may result, but this would be exceedingly
uncommon. Gastrointestinal anthrax is character-
ized by a single large lesion, not unlike the cuta-
neous lesion of anthrax, but which is present in the
gastrointestinal tract. There is usually a single,
large ulcer present, which may hemorrhage. Bac-
teremia may complicate any clinical type of
anthrax, and is overwhelming in septicemic
anthrax. When there is hematogenous dissemina-
tion from the skin or the lungs, some of the organ-
isms localize to the gastrointestinal tract. For this
reason, in cases of anthrax it is not uncommon to
find multiple small hemorrhagic ulcers through-
out the gastrointestinal tract. This is in contrast to
the single predominant lesion found when the
organisms are ingested and do not reach the intes-
tine via the bloodstream.
The presumptive diagnosis of anthrax depends
on demonstrating Gram-positive bacilli under
the eschar in cutaneous anthrax, or in the CSF in
anthrax meningitis, or in the blood in bacteremic
or septicemic anthrax. The sputum does not
usually contain B. anthracis in inhalation anthrax.
Samples of body fluids should be considered to
be extremely biohazardous, and the microbio-
logy laboratory should be warned prior to speci-
mens are being sent to them from the emergency
room. The presumptive diagnosis of anthrax
depends on demonstrating hemolysis on blood
agar. Other tests suggested for anthrax in Gram-
positive bacilli are the demonstration of a cap-
sule using a negative stain, e.g. Congo red or
India ink, or the demonstration of the character-
istic fir tree appearance of gelatin liquefaction
in a stat gelatin culture tube. Serologic tests
for anthrax usually take some time and are
unhelpful in the initial management of patients.
Post-exposure host Preferred antibiotic
Duration of
prophylaxis
Adults (normal/compromised
hosts)
Doxycycline 100 mg (PO)
every 12 h
7 days
or
Ciprofloxacin 400 mg (PO)
every 12 h
7 days
or
Levofloxacin 500 mg (PO)
every 24 h
7 days
or
Gatifloxacin 400 mg (PO)
every 24 h
7 days
or
Chloramphenicol 500 mg
(PO) every 6 h
7 days
Children (normal/compromised
hosts)
>12 years Same as adult
<12 years Doxycycline 2.2 mg/kg (PO)
every 12 h
7 days
or
Ciprofloxacin 30 mg/kg (PO)
every 12 h
7 days
or
Levofloxacin 250 mg (PO)
every 24 h
7 days
or
Gatifloxacin 200 mg (PO)
every 24 h
7 days
or
Chloramphenicol 25 mg/kg
(PO) every 6 h
7 days
Table 8 Plague: post-exposure pro-
phylaxis
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Specimens that are presumptively identified as
being positive for anthrax should be forwarded
to central laboratories for definitive identification
(Table 10).
Fortunately, B. anthracis is susceptible to the
majority of antibiotics. The organism is exquisitely
sensitive to penicillin and most b-lactams. The
most extensive experience in treating anthrax
has been with penicillin and with doxycycline.
In the recent New York experience, quinolones
were used. Some patients were treated with dou-
ble-drug therapy, but there is little evidence to
support this approach. B. anthracis is so exquisitely
sensitive that consideration of synergy is irrele-
vant. In some patients, clindamycin was added to
the regimen for its purported anti-endotoxin activ-
ity rather than its antibacterial effects.
Because of earlier treatment and recognition,
rather than because of more efficacious antibacter-
Table 9 Diagnostic approach to biological agents transmitted by inhalation
Plague Tularemia Legionella Anthrax
Symptoms
Sore throat    
Shortness of breath þ   þ
Hemoptysis þ þ  þ
Chest pain þþ   þþþ
Abdominal pain þ   
Nausea/vomiting þ   
Diarrhea þ  þ 
Signs
Relative bradycardia   þ 
Shock þ   þ
Laboratory features
Sputum Hemorrhagic
(raspberry syrup
sputum)
Hemorrhagic Mucoid/purulent Hemorrhagic
Gram stain sputum Gram-negative
coccobacilli
(bipolar staining)
Gram-negataive
coccobacilli
(non-bipolar staining)
Negative/normal
flora
Gram-positive
bacilli
Blood cultures þ   þ
Chest X-ray:
Infiltrates Bilateral segmented/
lobar
( consolidation
infiltrates)
Bilateral/segmented/
lobar ( consolidation)
Multilobar
infiltrates
Usually none
(if present, focal
infiltrates)
Mediastinal widening
Pleural effusion  þ (Bilateral bloody)  (Non-bloody) þ (Bilateral bloody)
BHA  þ  
WBCs
" LFTs   þ þ
" CPK   þ 
# PO4   þ 
BHA, bilateral hilar adenopathy.
Reproduced with permission from: Cunha BA. Bioterrorist anthrax: a clinical prespective (Part II). Infect Dis Practice 2002;
26: 81–85.
Table 10 Microbiological differences between B. anthracis
and non-B. anthracis bacilli
B. anthracis
Non-motile/encapsulated/long chains
No growth on penicillin agar (10 mg/mL)
‘Inverted fir-tree’ growth in gelatin
Gelatin liquefaction slow
No hemolysis of sheep red blood cells
Ferments salicin slowly or not at all
Pathogenic to laboratory animals
Non-B. anthracis (pseudo-anthrax bacilli)
Generally motile/non-encapsulated/short chains
Usually good growth on penicillin agar
Growth absent or atypical fir tree in gelatin
Gelatin liquefaction usually rapid
Hemolysis of sheep red blood cells
Usually ferment salicin rapidly
Non-pathogenic to laboratory animals
Reproduced with permission from: Cunha CB. Anthrax:
ancient plague, persistent problem. Infect Dis Practice 1999;
23: 35–9.
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ial therapy, the fatality rate with inhalation
anthrax in the New York experience was better
than had been previously reported.
From an infection control standpoint, inhala-
tion anthrax and cutaneous anthrax are not
very contagious, but the potential for contag-
iousness exists via organism- or spore-contami-
nated/infected body fluids [45–53] (Tables 11–
13).
S Y N D R O M I C C L I N I C A L
D I A G N O S T I C A N D T H E R A P E U T I C
A P P R O A C H
Bioterrorism in the emergency room presents spe-
cial challenges. The main focus of emergency room
personnel in a possible bioterrorism attack is to
quickly and rapidly arrive at a presumptive diag-
nosis of the agents involved. Early recognition
Table 11 Anthrax: empirical therapy for presumed anthrax pneumonia
Exposed hosts Preferred initial therapy IV!PO switch
Total duration of
therapy (IV/PO)
Adults Doxycycline 200 mg (IV)
every 12 h
Doxycycline 100 mg (PO)
every 12 h
14 days
or or
Penicillin G 4 MU (IV)
every 4 h
Amoxicillin 1 g (PO)
every 8 h
14 days
or or
Ciprofloxacin 400 mg (IV)
every 12 h
Ciprofloxacin 500 mg (PO)
every 12 h
14 days
or or
Levofloxacin 500 mg (IV)
every 24 h
Levofloxacin 500 mg (PO)
every 24 h
14 days
or or
Gatifloxacin 400 mg (IV)
every 24 h
Gatifloxacin 400 mg (PO)
every 24 h
14 days
Children
>12 years Same as adult
<12 years Doxycycline 2.2 mg/kg (IV)
every 12 h
Doxycycline 2.2 mg/kg (PO)
every 12 h
14 days
or or
Penicillin 50 000 U/kg (IV)
every 6 h
Amoxillin 40 mg/kg (PO)
every 8 h
14 days
or or
Ciprofloxacin 30 mg/kg (IV)
every 12 h
Ciprofloxacin 30 mg/kg (PO)
every 12 h
14 days
or or
Levofloxacin 250 mg (IV)
every 24 h
Levofloxacin 250 mg (PO)
every 24 h
14 days
or or
Gatifloxacin 200 mg (IV)
every 24 h
Gatifloxacin 200 mg (PO)
every 24 h
14 days
Adapted with permission from: Cunha BA. Anthrax. Antibiotic essentials. Birmingham MI, Physicians Press, 2002.
Table 12 Anthrax: infection control considerations
Potential for
patient-to-patient
spread
Potential for
patient-to-medical
personnel spread
Infection
control
precautions
Recommended
disinfection
procedures
Post-exposure
prophylaxis of
medical contacts
Emergency room/
hospital
Low Low Standard
universal
precautions
Sodium hypochlorite
or
quaternary ammonia
compounds
Unnecessary
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provides the ability to warn other centers to be
watchful for patients with similar syndrome com-
plexes. It also alerts hospital personnel to the
danger of infected patients, and alerts laboratory
personnel to the danger of handling biohazardous
materials. As is the case with other infectious
diseases, differential diagnosis is the key function
of physicians and consultants. When an outbreak
due to bioterrorism agent is well underway and
understood, awareness is heightened and the like-
lihood of misdiagnoses decreases greatly. How-
ever, the real challenge comes in diagnosing the
index cases correctly. Patients subjected to bioter-
rorist agents are likely to present with either neu-
rologic symptoms, e.g. botulism, or respiratory
symptoms, e.g. plague pneumonia, inhalation
anthrax, tularemic pneumonia, gastrointestinal ill-
nesses, enteric pathogens, bleeding diatheses, such
as the African hemorrhagic fevers, or pneumonias,
such as tularemic pneumonia, inhalation anthrax,
or plague pneumonia. The most difficult diagnos-
tic challenge would be to differentiate between
diseases that have similar features, e.g. tularemic
pneumonia versus inhalation anthrax, or to sepa-
rate these entities from other conditions in the
community that may cause confusion in the emer-
gency room setting, e.g. legionnaires’ disease ver-
sus tularemia. Except for botulism and the African
hemorrhagic fevers, and smallpox, all of the
remaining agents likely to be used in bioterrorism
are bacteria, and are susceptible to antibiotics
(Table 14).
While quinolones are preferable for enteral
pathogens, and streptomycin is preferred for pla-
gue, doxycycline is the antibiotic most likely to be
efficacious when a precise etiologic agent has not
yet been identified. Doxycycline, when used for
serious infections, is optimally given at a dose of
200 mg intravenously every 12 h for 72 h.
Because the drug has a long half-life and is highly
lipid soluble, this loading regimen needs to be
used in order to achieve a rapid therapeutic effect.
If a patient is given doxycycline, 100 mg intrave-
nously or orally every 12 h, as is usually recom-
mended, it will take 4–5 days before the maximum
therapeutic effect is achieved. This is far too long,
Table 13 Anthrax: post-exposure
prophylaxis
Post-exposure host Preferred antibiotic
Duration of
prophylaxis
Adults (normal/compromised
hosts)
Doxycycline 100 mg (PO)
every 12 h
60 days
or
Amoxicillin 1 g (PO)
every 8 h
60 days
or
Ciprofloxacin 400 mg (PO)
every 12 h
60 days
or
Levofloxacin 500 mg (PO)
every 24 h
60 days
or
Gatifloxacin 400 mg (PO)
every 24 h
60 days
Children (normal/compromised
hosts)
>12 years Same as adult
<12 years Amoxicillin 40 mg/kg (PO)
every 8 h
60 days
or
Ciprofloxacin 30 mg/kg (PO)
every 12 h
60 days
or
Levofloxacin 250 mg (PO)
every 24 h
60 days
or
Gatifloxacin 200 mg (PO)
every 24 h
60 days
Reproduced with permission from: Cunha BA. Antibiotic essentials. Birming-
ham, MI: Physicians Press, 2002.
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and anyone who has a critical infectious disease
for which doxycycline is an appropriate treatment
should always use the loading regimen described
for seriously ill patients [54,55].
Infection control measures are important in con-
taining the infection and allaying fears when bio-
logical agents are used that have little or no
contagious potential. The microbiology laboratory,
in particular, and medical and nursing personnel
as well are likely to have the highest potential for
becoming infected. A rapid alert system should be
in place, so that even presumptive cases are effec-
tively and rapidly identified, and this information
is disseminated to other medical centers in the
area. A high grade of suspicion and constant vigil-
ance are necessary as bioterrorism becomes a fact
of life, and new manifestations of infection due to
these agents should be expected and looked for.
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